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Abstract 
 
Since conducting nuclear tests in 1998, both India and Pakistan have decided to build a “minimum nuclear 
deterrence”, replacing the policy of “non-weaponized nuclear deterrence”, followed since 1970s.  Both 
countries appear to have accelerated their nuclear and missile programmes, particularly since 2001, while 
the international attention has been focused elsewhere such as Afghanistan and Iraq. Free from intensive 
international scrutiny, India and Pakistan continued to develop, test and deploy different types of ballistic 
missiles.  The nuclear and missile developments in South Asia are gaining greater momentum rather than 
slowing down and India and Pakistan appear to be in danger of being trapped into a costly strategic arms 
race.  This paper discusses various nuclear and missile developments in India and Pakistan and their 
technological capabilities.  It also analyses the likely medium and long-term nuclear and missile 
developments or trends in South Asia and their implications for regional and global security, particularly 
from the view of nuclear and missile non-proliferation.  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Since India and Pakistan conducted a series of nuclear tests in 1998, both countries have 
embarked on a policy of ‘minimum nuclear-deterrent’ and develop a series of ballistic 
missiles to implement this policy. This paper analyses nuclear and missile developments 
in India and Pakistan.  It also compares strategic technological capabilities between the 
two countries and discusses likely developments or trends in the short, medium, and 
long-term.  Although a number of studies have highlighted various nuclear and missile 
technology developments in India and Pakistan, there are very few studies that try to 
make an in depth comparison of strategic technological capabilities between the two 
countries and their likely impact on future developments.  This paper also draws some 
conclusions about the implications of the nuclear and missile build up to the regional and 
global security, particularly from the view of non-proliferation.   
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2. Diplomatic, Military and Policy Developments 
 
Following their nuclear tests in 1998, both India and Pakistan announced their intention 
to move towards the next stage of deploying nuclear forces.  In the winter of 1998-1999 
Pakistan launched a military operation (involving militants supported by armed forces) to 
occupy and control territories around Kargil on the Indian side of the Line of Control in 
Kashmir.  However, facing strong counter military offensive from India and international 
criticism Pakistan was forced to withdraw.  It is likely that Pakistan was sure that India 
would not launch counter-military action in the face of potential use of  nuclear weapons 
by Pakistan.  The Kargil conflict has exposed the limitations of the possession of nuclear 
weapons and demonstrated the importance of conventional forces.  Subsequently, India 
released its draft nuclear doctrine on 17 August 1999 which advocated “minimum but 
credible deterrence” through the deployment of a nuclear triad, that is land and sea based 
missiles and air-delivered weapons. It was estimated that India would be deploying 350-
400 nuclear weapons.  The draft doctrine stated that India’s nuclear weapons are not 
“country specific” and the survivability of these forces “will be enhanced by a 
combination of multiple redundant systems, mobility, dispersion, and deception.”   By 
stating that its nuclear weapons deployment is not ‘country-specific’ India has made it 
clear that its nuclear weapons would be aimed not only at Pakistan but also at its bigger 
rival China.  However, India’s draft nuclear doctrine pledged to pursue policies of “no-
first use” and never to use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear state.  India also 
reiterated that it remained in favour of complete disarmament, despite its decision to 
deploy nuclear weapons.  Pakistan responded by declaring its own policy towards nuclear 
deployment.   Pakistan’s stated aims of its ‘minimum nuclear deterrence’ are two fold --  
first, to achieve some parity with India’s nuclear capability; and second, to deter India’s 
superior conventional forces. Subsequently, it announced the establishment of formal 
nuclear command structure.   
 
In December 2001, armed militants attacked Indian Parliament in New Delhi.  India 
accused Pakistan for the attack and withdrew its diplomats from Pakistan and moved a 
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large number of troops along the border and Pakistan responded by moving its troops to 
the border.  The military and the diplomatic tensions between the two continued until 
early 2003 and India announced the establishment of a formal nuclear command structure 
on 04 January 2003.   It also announced its intention to test its Agni III missile with a 
range of 3000 km during 2003, which is likely to create concerns in China, as it is 
capable of striking targets deep into that country (The Times of India, 7 February 2003). 
Furthermore, India refused to accept the International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic 
Missile Proliferation (ICOC) – an initiative to overcome the limitations of the Missile 
Technology Control Regime (MTCR), against ballistic missile proliferation and appears 
to be encouraging its industry to export missiles and related components (The Hindu, 15 
November 2002 and 06 May 2003).  Since the nuclear tests in 1998, although both 
countries publicly stated that they did not intend to start an arms race, they went on to 
develop and launch number of missiles as part of their nuclear weapons deployment and 
integrated some of these systems with their military forces.  These developments are 
discussed in the following sections.  
 
3. Nuclear Weapons: Developments and Capabilities 
 
Since 1945, nuclear technology has become increasingly sophisticated due to 
technological change and developments in countries such as the US and the former 
Soviet Union.  By the late 1970s, the nuclear technology has almost fully matured and the 
rate of design innovations and truly new concepts slowed significantly.  As a result late 
comers such as Pakistan benefited and they need not to go thorough the phase of 
developing a strong basic research base to successfully construct nuclear weapons. In the 
context of India and Pakistan it is important to take this into account when analysing the 
balance of strategic technological capabilities between the two countries.  A strong basic 
research base, and extensive nuclear infrastructure such as mining of uranium, 
enrichment of uranium metal in the fissile isotope U-235, production and extraction of 
plutonium, production of tritium, and separation of deuterium and Li-6 to build 
thermonuclear weapons could contribute to achieving a high level of capability.  
However, it is quite possible to build an intermediate level nuclear capability with limited 
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infrastructure and highly focused resources. In other words, the country enjoying a 
superior nuclear technological capability is unlikely to maintain that level of superiority 
over its less developed rival, as there are strong limitations to new innovations.  This is 
important to keep in mind when comparing the nuclear capabilities between India and 
Pakistan.  India started its nuclear programme at least 15 years earlier than Pakistan.  
Whether this advantage did help India to command a relative superiority over the late 
comer Pakistan; and if it did, whether India will be able to maintain this superiority in the 
future are interesting questions which need proper investigation.   
 
From the 1998 nuclear tests by India and Pakistan, despite the claims and counter claims 
over the types and yields of weapons tested, it is evident that both countries have 
acquired significant nuclear weapons capabilities.  India and Pakistan have followed 
different routes to produce weapon-grade nuclear materials.  India followed the 
plutonium route; that is, by reprocessing spent fuel from nuclear reactors it produced 
plutonium stockpile to develop nuclear weapons. On the other hand, Pakistan primarily 
followed the method of uranium enrichment and produced highly enriched uranium to 
build its nuclear weapons.   However, recent studies suggest that Pakistan is also 
developing the capability to produce weapon-grade plutonium (see Albright, 2000; 
Cordesman, 2002).  While India has “developed a massive indigenous civil and military” 
nuclear infrastructure (Cordesman, 2002), “Pakistan lacks an extensive civil nuclear 
power infrastructure, and its weapons programme is not as broad as India’s” (FAS 
Website).  Unlike India’s nuclear programme, which includes a significant civil nuclear 
energy component, almost the entire nuclear programme in Pakistan is focused on 
weapons applications.  In other words, it is generally believed that Pakistan has been 
utilising its nuclear programme primarily (or solely) to produce fissile material which 
could be used to make nuclear weapons  (see Albright, 2000). On the other hand, a 
number of studies have concluded that India has not been employing the whole of its 
available capacity to produce weapon-grade plutonium (e.g. Albright, 2000, RAND 
2001).  Although this appears to be a deliberate policy on the part of India, the impact of 
this factor on the nuclear balance between India and Pakistan needs to be taken into 
account.    
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One of the major studies about nuclear weapons in South Asia was done by David 
Albright at the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) in the US.  This has 
been widely referred to by a number of other authors.  Therefore, it merits a brief 
discussion here.  Using a “more sophisticated method” than the one he employed in his 
past studies (i.e. using Crystal Ball software and ‘Monte Carlo’ approach), Albright 
calculated the size of India’s stock of weapon-grade plutonium and Pakistan’s inventory 
of separated weapon-grade uranium and weapon-grade plutonium.  He has calculated 
India’s inventory by “estimating total production of weapon-grade plutonium in the 
Cirus, Dhruva, and power reactors and by subtracting drawdowns from nuclear testing, 
process losses, and civil uses of the weapon grade plutonium” (Albright, 2000).  He 
employed two estimates: (i) the median value (the value midway between the smallest 
and largest value, which was about 310 kilograms of weapons grade plutonium; and the 
range of values between 5th and 95th percentiles, which are 240 Kgs to 395 Kgs 
respectively.  In other words, he claimed that it was 90 per cent certain that the true value 
of (India’s inventory) at the end of 1999 was between 240 and 395 Kgs, where the 
median value was about 310 Kgs.  He employed the measure of 4.5 Kgs plutonium per 
nuclear weapon to calculate total number of nuclear weapons that India could have made 
using the available fissile material.  Accordingly, the median estimate was about 65 
weapons and the 5th and 95th percentiles were 45 and 95 weapons respectively.  Albright 
estimated that Cirus and Dhuruva together produced 410 Kgs of weapon-grade 
plutonium, the power reactors produced about 25 Kgs, and the drawdown was about 125 
Kgs.  In his calculation Albright ignored any highly enriched uranium (HEU) produced 
by India as insignificant. 
 
In the case of Pakistan, he estimated the inventory of weapon-grade uranium by taking 
into account factors such as enrichment capacity, the feed stock into the enrichment plant, 
and the amount of LEU produced in Pakistan during the 1990s. Then, he subtracted the 
drawdowns from the 1998 nuclear tests. The estimated median value of Pakistan’s 
inventory was 690 Kgs, and the 5th and 95th percentiles were 585 and 800 Kgs 
respectively.  The number of nuclear weapons Pakistan could have made from its 
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weapon-grade uranium stock was estimated by employing a measure of 18 Kgs of 
weapon-grade uranium per weapon. Accordingly, the median value was 39 weapons, and 
the 5th and 95th percentiles were 30 and 52 weapons respectively.  Furthermore, Albright 
estimated that Pakistan could build a single nuclear weapon using the small amount of 
weapon-grade plutonium produced by one of its reactors. 
 
Table 1: Estimates of Nuclear Capabilities in India and Pakistan 
 
Type of Material/Estimate India Pakistan 
   
I. Weapon-grade Plutonium   
Median (Kg) 310 5.5. 
5th and 95th Percentiles (Kgs) 240-395 1.7 - 13 
   
A. II. Weapon-grade Uranium   
Median (Kg) Insignificant 690 
5th and 95th  Percentiles (Kgs) Insignificant 585 - 800 
   
III. Nuclear Weapon Equivalent of 
Fissile Material Stockpile 
  
Median (Kg) 65 39 
5th and 95th  Percentiles (Kgs) 45 - 95 30 – 52 
   
IV. Civil Plutonium Stockpile   
   
1. Safeguarded by the IAEA:   
Separated 25 0 
Unseparated 4,100 600 (Rounded figure) 
   
2. Unsafeguarded:   
Separated 800 0 
Unseparated 3,400 0 
   
Total Civil Plutonium 8,300 600 (Rounded figure) 
   
3. Weapon-Equivalent 1,400 75 
   
 
Source: David Albright (October 11, 2000), India’s and Pakistan’s Fissile Material and Nuclear Weapons 
Inventories, end of 1999.  
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Using similar methods of calculation, Albright has also estimated the potential nuclear 
weapons capability of India and Pakistan, if they had decided to use the reactor-grade 
(civil) plutonium.  Using the measure of 8Kg of civil plutonium per weapon, he estimated 
that India could have produced 8300 Kgs of civil plutonium which is equivalent to 1040 
weapons and Pakistan could have produced 600 Kgs (of reactor grade plutonium) that is 
equivalent to 75 weapons.  However, he acknowledged that “almost all of this civil 
plutonium is in spent fuel, and thus not suitable for use in nuclear weapons” (Albright, 
2000).   Various estimates of nuclear capabilities of India and Pakistan by Albright are 
illustrated in Table 1. 
 
In 1997, A. H. Nayyar, A.H. Toor, and Zia Mian attempted to estimate  “the amount of 
weapons-grade plutonium that could have been produced from unsafeguarded power 
reactors in India, if these reactors were operated deliberately for this purpose” (Nayyar et 
al., 1997, p. 190).  According to them, “India could have used its power reactors to 
produce 1,450 kg of WGPu beyond the estimated 425 kg [by Albright and others] from 
research reactors” (Nayyar et al., 1997, p. 197). However, they also acknowledged that 
there was no evidence that India had used power reactors to produce WGPu.  They 
argued that if India wanted to use its power reactors to produce WGPu, the only 
constraint it faced was the processing capacity.  They have concluded that once 
Kalpakkam II reprocessing plant starts operating, India could “extract about 1,500 kg 
WGPu from the accumulated 1,579 tons of as yet un-processed spent fuel in less than two 
years” (Nayyar et al., 1997, p. 196).  They reasoned that India was likely to have built up 
its fissile material stock file by reprocessing spent fuel from the unsafeguarded power 
reactors mainly to produce high yield weapons. 
 
In the case of Pakistan, the authors believed that “rather than closing down the facilities 
for uranium enrichment” completely, as claimed by the Pakistan government in 1990-
1991, it continued to operate them at “a much lower (than weapon-grade) level of 
enrichment” mode (Nayyar et al, 1997, p. 198).  It was estimated that total Pakistani 
enrichment capacity was between 9,000 SWU’s (kilogram Separative Work Units per 
year, which has dimensions of kg/year) and 15,000 SWUs (for Kahuta facility).   With 
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this capacity, between 1991 and 1995, Pakistan was estimated to have produced between 
6 and 22 tones of 5-3 per cent enrichment uranium (or lesser quantities of 20 per cent 
uranium).  In other words, the authors argued that Pakistan was capable of producing 
about 200 kg of 90 per cent uranium – “roughly double the quantity of weapons-grade 
uranium estimated by Albright et al” within a period between few months and a year 
(Nayyar et al, 1997, p. 200). This could have substantially increased its existing HEU 
stocks. Table-2 shows the estimates by Nayyar et al. 
 
Table-2: Estimates of LEU Stockpile Accumulate by Pakistan between 1991 and 1995 
and Time Required to Produce 200Kg of WGPu from LEU Stockpile 
 
Level of 
Enrichme
nt of 
LEU (%) 
Mass of 
Product (kg) 
for 9,000 
SWUs 
Mass of 
Product (kg) 
for 15,000 
SWUs 
Time in Weeks for 
9,000 SWUs to 
Produce 200 kg of 
Wgpu from LEU 
Stockpile 
Time in Weeks for 
15,000 SWUs to 
Produce 200 kg of 
Wgpu from LEU 
Stockpile 
     
3 13, 123 21, 871 49 26 
     
5 6, 245 10, 407 33 17 
     
  
Source: Nayyar et al. (1997), “Fissile Material Production Potential in South Asia,” Science and Global 
Security, vol. 6, p. 201. 
 
If these estimates by Nayyar et al (that Pakistan was in a position after 1995 to produce 
200 Kgs of 90 per cent uranium in about few months to a year period) are nearly 
accurate, it is likely that Pakistan could have produced over 400 Kgs of 90 per cent 
uranium by 2001.  Because, it is quite likely that Pakistan went ahead to utilise its full 
capacity to produce 90 per cent uranium since its nuclear tests in 1998.  That means, 
while India has been following a ‘restrained’ and ‘limited’ approach towards building 
fissile material stockpile and nuclear weapons, Pakistan has been utilising its entire 
capacity to build up not only fissile material stockpile but also building of nuclear 
weapons. 
 
In 2001, the US Department of Defence estimated that India could “deploy a few nuclear 
weapons within a few days to a week” (Cardesman, 2002, p. 24).  It concluded that 
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although India is capable of producing all components required for plutonium-based 
nuclear weapons, foreign equipment would help it to develop more sophisticated 
weapons.  In the case of Pakistan, it concluded that although it “has a well developed 
nuclear infrastructure, including facilities for uranium conversion and enrichment and the 
infrastructure to produce nuclear weapons,” it “has less of a military production 
infrastructure than rival India, and thus will be forced to rely on outside support for its 
efforts for several years” (Cordesman, 2002, p. 36).  The general perception is that China 
has been the main foreign source of technology assistance for Pakistan’s nuclear 
programme.  Until now, China has played a major role in assisting Pakistan’s nuclear 
programme.  China’s assistance included a 25-kiloton warhead design, significant 
quantity of HEU for building few weapons, and 5,000 custom-made ring magnets for 
high speed centrifuges, (Cordesman, 2002, p. 44).  According to the Carnegie 
Endowment reports, China assisted Pakistan to complete its 40-Mwt heavy water 
research reactor at Khushab in 1996.  It appears China also has been assisting Pakistan to 
build a facility linked to Khushab reactor, either a fuel fabrication plant or a plutonium 
separation (reprocessing) plant.  Pakistan did not have a fuel fabrication facility to 
manufacture fuel for the new reactor (Cordesman, 2002, p. 44).   It is further believed that 
China might have supplied the design for a small tritium (neutron) initiator (which is 
located at the centre of the weapon grade uranium core of a nuclear bomb) that starts the 
fission chain reaction (Albright and Hibbs, 1992).  As China factor has been very 
important in Pakistan’s nuclear capability building over the years, it is imperative that it 
is taken into account in any analysis of nuclear balance between India and Pakistan.  
 
Table 3 illustrates capabilities of India and Pakistan in thirteen different areas of nuclear 
technology, identified by the US Department of Defense (1996).  The author has updated 
capabilities of India and Pakistan summarised in DoD’s (1996) ‘nuclear weapons foreign 
technology assessment’ by taking into account various developments since 1996.   The 
DoD employed a four-point scale – (i) limited capability; (ii) some capability; (iii) 
sufficient level; and (iv) exceeding sufficient level; to assess technological capabilities of 
different countries.  ‘Sufficient Level’ is defined as the capability required “to produce 
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entry-level WMD, delivery systems, or other hardware or software useful in WMD 
development, integration or use” (DoD, 1996, p. II-B-1). 
 
Table 3: Comparison of Nuclear Technological Capabilities between India and 
Pakistan 
 
Technology/Weapon Systems India Pakistan 
Enrichment Feed-stocks Production  xx xxx 
Uranium Enrichment Processes Not Known xxx 
Nuclear Fission Reactors xxxx xx 
Plutonium Extraction (Reprocessing) xxx x 
Lithium Production Not Known Not Known 
Nuclear Weapons Design and Development xxxx xxxx 
Safing, Arming, Fusing, and Firing xxx xxx 
Radiological Weapons xx x 
Manufacturing of Nuclear Components xxx xxx 
Nuclear Weapons Development Testing xxx xxx 
Nuclear Weapons Custody, Transport and Control xxx xxx 
Heavy Water Production xxxx x 
Tritium Production xxxx x 
 
Source: The table was prepared by the author using ‘Nuclear weapons foreign technology assessment 
summary’ in US Department of Defense, Militarily Critical Technologies List – Part II: Weapons of Mass 
Destruction Technologies, 1996. But the author updated this summary taking into account various 
developments since 1996. 
 
Notes: 
x – Limited Capability; xx – Some Capability; xxx – Sufficient Level of Capability; xxxx – Exceeding 
Sufficient Level of Capability 
 
 
It is evident from Table 3 that Pakistan is not far behind India’s nuclear capability, 
particularly in areas such as fissile material production, design and development of 
nuclear weapons. Pakistan has developed sufficient capability or more than sufficient 
capability in enrichment feed-stock production, uranium enrichment processes, nuclear 
weapons design and development, safing, arming, fusing and firing, and nuclear weapons 
development testing.  While India appears to have superiority in heavy water production, 
tritium production and plutonium extraction, Pakistan has a clear superiority in uranium 
enrichment processes.  India’s advantage in plutonium and tritium production gives it an 
edge over Pakistan in developing high yield weapons.   However, Table 3 suggests that 
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Pakistan has developed a comparable nuclear weapons capability over the years.  
Although India has developed strong capabilities by the early 1970s when Pakistan had 
almost no capability, the latter appears to have established very significant level of over 
all capability by the late 1990s (as shown by Table 3).  Although there is no clear 
evidence about the capability of Pakistan to produce tritium, it is likely that it has 
established a small facility for tritium purification by using the technology (plans and the 
know-how) obtained clandestinely from Germany in 1987 (Albright and Hibbs, 1992).  
 
The major aspects of nuclear programmes in India and Pakistan, particularly the potential 
nuclear weapons capabilities can be summarised as following:  
 
(i) India’s civil and military nuclear activities are extensive and much broader than 
Pakistan’s programme; 
(ii) India’s nuclear weapons programme is ‘limited’ and it does not utilise the entire 
capability available to produce weapon-grade material;  
(iii) Pakistan’s nuclear programme is ‘bomb-centred’, that is, it makes weapons grade 
material using almost the entire nuclear infrastructure and uses them to build 
nuclear weapons; 
(iv) Pakistan either possesses or likely to possess in short to medium term sufficient 
number of nuclear weapons to match India’s capability; 
(v)  Pakistan has received and is likely to receive in future significant technology 
assistance from China.   
(vi) Both India and Pakistan have been able to achieve a high degree of self-reliance 
in producing weapon-grade materials and building nuclear weapons. 
(vii) Although India appears to have a larger stockpile of weapon-grade material and 
also has greater capability to produce more weapon-grade materials than Pakistan, 
this advantage or technological superiority is likely to disappear in the medium to 
long-term.   
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4. Ballistic Missiles: Developments and Capabilities 
 
Both India and Pakistan appear to have chosen ballistic missiles as main delivery systems 
for their nuclear weapons in the medium and long-term. Although both countries do have 
ballistic missile systems capable of launching nuclear weapons, their missile programmes 
are yet to mature fully.  Unlike the case of producing weapon-grade materials and nuclear 
weapons, the gap in missile capabilities between the two countries appears to be more 
clear and significant.  Missile systems involve a large number of critical technologies and 
the rate of technological change is still relatively high, and therefore ‘catching up’ by a 
late comer without foreign assistance is likely to be more difficult.  In the context of India 
and Pakistan, this is more likely to decide the balance of strategic capabilities between 
the two countries in the medium and long-term than the capability to build nuclear 
weapons.  Unlike the case of building nuclear weapons where both India and Pakistan 
have already entered the production-mode, their missile programmes still appear to be 
largely in the development phase.  Both countries are developing different types of 
missiles based on solid and liquid propulsion systems. Tables 4 and 5 illustrate the main 
characteristics of missiles developed by India and Pakistan respectively.   
 
The Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) under the Ministry of 
Defence (MOD) runs India’s missile programme.  At present, the programme involves 
mainly developing two families of missiles – Prithvi and Agni. India has either already 
started producing or in the process of producing different versions of short range Prithvi 
missiles for different users such as Army, Air Force and Navy.  Because of historic 
reasons these are single stage liquid systems which have seen incremental and cumulative 
improvements over the years through large number of test launches.  Prithvi is a single 
stage liquid fuel system – red fuming nitric acid oxidiser with a 50/50 mix of Xylidiene 
and triethylamine fuel.   It is not an efficient system and it is difficult to handle, as it 
requires loading prior to the launch of the missile.  This imposes certain operational 
constraints in battlefield conditions.  For strategic and tactical reasons such as not to 
lower the nuclear threshold, the shorter range Prithvi-Is and certain Navy-versions are 
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likely to be used only for carrying conventional warheads.  Other versions are likely to be 
deployed to carry nuclear warheads.   
 
Table 4: Ballistic Missiles Developed by India 
 
Name Type Propulsion Warhead/ Range Status 
Prithvi I (SS150) SRBM Single stage 
Liquid system 
1000 kg/150Km Production 
Completed/Stopped  
Prithvi II (SS250) SRBM Single stage 
Liquid system 
500-1000 kg/250 km In Production 
Dhanush SLBM Liquid system 500 kg/250 km 
(achieved 150 km 
range during test) 
Tested successfully on 21 
September 2001. In 
Development 
Agni  
(Technology 
Demonstrator) 
IRBM Two stage –
Solid + Liquid 
1000 kg/2000 km 
(Actual range achieved 
was 1450 km) 
Development Programme 
completed after three test 
flights 
Agni I MRBM Single stage 
Solid system 
1000 kg/700-1000 km Tested successfully on 25 
January 2002 (700 km 
achieved) and on 09 
January 2003. 
Development/Operational 
Agni II IRBM Two stage – 
Solid + Solid 
1000 kg / 2500-3000 
km 
Tested successfully on 11 
April 1999 and 17 
January 2001 (Over 2100 
km achieved) 
Operational and entered 
full-scale production in 
early 2002. 
Agni III IRBM Two stage – 
Solid + Liquid 
1000kg/3500-4000 km Under Development.  
First Test Flight Expected 
in 2003 
Surya 
 
ICBM Two stage 
solid system 
1000 kg/8000 km Likely to be developed. 
India has the capability to 
develop an ICBM within 
15 to 24 months from the 
day of decision. 
 
Source: Compiled by the Author  
 
 
Initially, for historic reasons, Agni was developed by combining the liquid stage of 
Prithvi and the first solid stage of SLV-3 (from civil space programme). However, by the 
late 1990s, it has been optimised and standardised as single and two stage solid systems 
for medium and intermediate ranges respectively.  It is quite likely that India may 
develop a navy-version of Agni I and II in the near future.  Also, India has the capability 
and the resources to develop an ICBM within a short time (between 15 to 24 months), if 
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it decides to do so.  Although the missile programme appears to have been initiated 
without clear long-term vision, events within the region and outside the region appear to 
have shaped it into a strategically coherent and technologically sound and meaningful 
programme.  This is clear from the way Agni was transformed into a solid-based system 
from a combined liquid and solid system.  Solid propellant missiles are stable, easily 
storable, and easy to handle before launching.  Unlike liquid systems, they do not need 
fuel loading before the launch, making it more efficient and less vulnerable to exposure. 
Although liquid based systems could be relatively easy to manoeuvre on-flight and they 
could be more accurate than the solid systems, they are very complex and inefficient 
because they are difficult to handle, involve longer time for preparation, and require 
larger launch support infrastructure.  Furthermore, liquid engines incorporate large 
number of components, making it more complex for operation. 
 
India’s missile programme is highly indigenous with relatively small degree of 
dependence on foreign imports, particularly in the area of high precision materials and 
micro electronic components.   If the civil space programme is taken into account, India 
has already established a world class capability in solid propulsion technology, guidance 
systems including on-board micro-processors and software, and re-entry technology.  
India has capacity to produce over 600 tonnes of solid propellants per annum from 
various facilities.  Indian Industry has learned over the years to optimise fabrication of 
hardware such as rocket motor casings from maraging steel, fabrication of components 
from advanced materials such as titanium alloy, solid and liquid propellants such as 
HTPB, UDMH, MMH, ammonium perchlorate, and nitrogen tetroxide.  It also has 
developed a large network of suppliers and sub-contractors in the industry.  India’s 
capability in guidance system has grown significantly in the 1990s.  This is clearly 
reflected by the joint development of BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles by India and 
Russia.  These missiles incorporate Russian liquid fuel Ramjet propulsion system and 
Indian guidance system. They are expected to be superior to the US Tomahawk and 
Russian Moskit (Telegraph India, 06 February 2002).  One of the prototype Brahmos 
cruise missiles was tested on 12 February 2003.  The fact that Russia preferred to develop 
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these sophisticated and advanced missiles jointly with India has demonstrated that India 
has established a world-class capability in guidance systems.   
 
Table 5: Ballistic Missiles Developed/Acquired by Pakistan 
 
Name Type Propulsion Warhead/ Range Status 
Haft I 
(Based on French 
sounding rocket 
technology) 
SRBM Single stage 
Solid system 
500 kg/60-80 km 
350 kg/-100 km 
Tested/Not produced 
M-11 
(Acquired from China) 
SRBM Single stage 
Solid system 
700 kg/300 Km Acquired about 30 
missiles from China in 
1992 
Haft II 
(Based on French 
Sounding rocket 
technology/Haft I) 
SRBM Two stage  
Solid system 
500 kg/280 km 
300 kg/300 km 
Small scale 
production from 1996.  
Improved version 
tested on 28 June 
2002. 
Haft III 
(Based on Chinese M-
11/Haft I) 
SRBM Two stage Solid 
system 
500kg/550 km Tested on 26 June 
2002. In Development 
Ghauri I 
(Based on North 
Korean No-dong) 
MRBM Single stage 
Liquid system 
500-750 kg/1300-
1500 km (Achieved 
1100 km range in 
test) 
Tested on 06 April 
1998 and on 24 May 
2002. Believed to 
have deployed 5-10 
missiles with 47th 
artillery brigade.  
Ghauri II 
(Based on North 
Korean No-dong) 
IRBM Single stage 
Liquid system 
1000kg/2000-2300 
km 
Under Development 
Ghauri III 
(Based on North 
Korean Taepo-dong) 
IRBM Two stage 
Liquid system 
1000 kg/3000 km Under Development 
Shaheen I (Based on 
Chinese M-9 with 
modified M11 TEL 
launcher) 
SRBM Single stage 
Solid System 
1000 kg/750 km Tested in April 1999, 
February 2000, and 
October 2002. 
Shaheen II 
(Pak-version of 
Chinese M18 or 
Improved version of M 
9) 
IRBM Two stage Solid 
System 
1000 kg/2000 km Under Development 
 
Source: Compiled by the Author 
 
 
Overall, India has established a very high level of indigenous capabilities in building both 
liquid and solid propulsion missile systems.  India’s capabilities particularly in solid 
rocket motor technology is comparable to the best in the world.  Over the years, the 
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industry has developed a high level of capabilities in producing advanced materials such 
as maraging steel, titanium alloy, different chemicals for solid and liquid propellants, 
certain composite materials, and various hardware and software for inertial navigation 
systems including rate integrated gyros, dynamically tuned gyros, and servo 
accelerometers, and on-board computers.  
 
Pakistan’s missile programme started with sounding rocket technology imported from 
France.  This sounding rocket technology and associated fabrication facilities were used 
to develop short range missiles Haft I and Haft II.  However, Pakistan appears to have 
made little headway in developing an indigenous programme from Haft I and II.  It 
acquired M-11 SRBMs from China in the early 1990s and since then Pakistan has been 
developing mainly two families of missiles: (i) Shaheen (SRBM and IRBM) based on 
Chinese M-9/M-11 solid propulsion technology; and (ii) Ghauri (SRBM and IRBM) 
based on North Korean No-dong 1 and Taepo-dong 1 liquid propulsion systems.  If 
Pakistan acquires the technology of Taepo-dong 1 for its Ghauri II and III, it will be able 
to employ the warhead spin-up technology (re-entry), which will considerably increase 
the accuracy of warhead. There appears to be some confusion over Haft III and 
Shaheen/Shaheen I among Western analysts.  Whether they are same or different missile 
systems does not make much difference, as they are SRBMs and both are largely based 
on Chinese M-9 or M-11 solid propulsion systems.  The Shaheen project is controlled by 
the National Defence Complex (NDC), a subsidiary of the Pakistan Atomic Energy 
Commission (PAEC), which used the facilities of Space and Upper Atmosphere Research 
Commission (SUPARCO).  The A. Q. Khan Research Laboratories, which also controls 
the nuclear weapon programme, runs the Ghauri project.  There appears to be a strong 
bureaucratic rivalry among these agencies that may hinder close co-ordination between 
their development projects (Siddiqa-Agha, 1999, pp. 355-56). 
 
Pakistan has made significant progress since 1996 in developing short and medium range 
ballistic missiles, mainly because of foreign technology assistance received from China 
and North Korea.  Particularly, after North Korea tested the No-dong missile in 1993, 
Pakistan appears to have established a collaborative relationship with that country with 
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the aim of procuring complete missile systems and the production technology.   It appears 
that Pakistani observers were present when the missile was first tested in 1993 
(Bermudez, 1999, p. 21).  North Korea took considerable time to fully develop various 
sub-systems of No-dong.  This involved development activities such as scaling up the 
Isayev 9D21 engine and improving the guidance system, which were used in its earlier 
missiles – Hwasong 5 and 6.  By 1999, Korea was estimated to have produced between 
75 and 150 No-dong missiles.  Of these, it was believed to have sold between 24 and 50 
missiles to other countries including Pakistan.  It is also believed that North Korea has 
agreed to provide Pakistan “key components from either the No-dong or Taepo-dong 
programmes, about 12 to 25 No-dong missiles, and at least one TEL or MEL”.  Most of 
these items were supplied by the Changgwang Sinyong Corporation to Khan Research 
Laboratories at Kahuta in 1996 (Bermudez, 1999, p. 24).  The first test flight of Ghauri in 
April 1998 was “in fact, a DPRK-produced No-dong launched from a MEL,” which 
appears to have been conducted by Pakistan in the presence of North Korean observers 
(Bermudez, 1999, p. 24).   
 
Again, it appears that Ghauri-II that was launched in April 1999 was also a North Korean 
produced No-dong.  These two tests were considered as the second and fourth tests of 
No-dong missiles system respectively after the first North Korean test launch in 1993.  
Iran’s Shehab-III test flight in July 1998 was believed to be the third test of No-dong 
(Bermudez, 1999, pp. 24-25).   Iran’s missile collaboration with North Korea seems to be 
much closer and longer than Pakistan’s relationship with North Korea. However, since 
the early 1990s, Pakistan’s missile technology relationship with North Korea appears to 
have been growing stronger.  This is demonstrated by the presence of Pakistani observers 
during the Taepo-dong 1 SLV launch in 1998.  It is evident that by the late 1990s, North 
Korea has developed the Taepo-dong 1-- a two-stage ballistic missile based on liquid 
propulsion.   It is not a coincidence that at the same time Pakistan has announced that it 
started developing an IRBM.  It is quite likely that Pakistan could acquire Taepo-dong I 
or II from North Korea and launch it as an indigenously developed missile (Ghauri III).  
In the present international political climate where North Korea is under significant 
pressure from an aggressive US administration and also due to its dependency on 
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international aid to relieve domestic hardships, it may feel constrained to conduct a series 
of Taepo-dong test flights.  Therefore, it may decide to help and use Pakistan to carry out 
test launchings of Taepo-dong missiles, which serves the objectives of both North Korea 
and Pakistan.  Unlike Iran, North Korea’s another missile-collaborator, which faces 
strong American and international pressure, Pakistan is likely to get away with 
international pressure or reaction without serious consequences, if it decides to test 
launch Taepo-dong missiles as indigenously developed Ghauri IIIs.  However it may 
choose to test launch these missiles in a conducive international environment, for 
example, after India conducts its next Agni test.  India’s missile programme provides 
Pakistan the legitimacy it requires for conducting test launch and its closeness with the 
US since the Afghan War is likely to help overcome any international reaction without 
serious impact.    
 
Therefore, it is likely that Pakistan will be able to acquire intermediate and long range 
ballistic missiles capabilities within the next five years.  In the medium and long term, 
Pakistan is likely to create local capabilities to produce a number of hardware required, 
using imported know-how and technology from different sources such as China, North 
Korea, and European countries.  Once it masters the Korean missile systems, it may find 
it relatively easy to incrementally improve critical subsystems such as guidance systems 
using advanced components, acquiring from various sources. For example, it could 
relatively easily improve the guidance system using Global Positioning System (GPS) 
and/ or stellar navigation.  The GPSs are readily available, as they are increasingly used 
for civil applications.  Already, over 300 versions of GPS receivers are sold throughout 
the world  (Wick et al., 1994). 
 
Apart from the nuclear and missile complex, Pakistan has a sizeable defence industrial 
complex which includes six weapons production and three R&D facilities – the Defence 
Science and Technology Organisation (DESTO), the Military Vehicle Research and 
Development Establishment (MVRDE), and the Armament Research and Development 
Establishment (ARDE). It established the Margalla Electronics and Institute of Optronics 
in the mid-1980s to manufacture radar and night vision devices. Pakistan could utilise 
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these facilities (if it has not already done so) and the private industry to absorb the missile 
technology acquired from both China and North Korea and it could enhance the 
indigenous capability to execute its missile programme in the future.  Already, Pakistan 
appears to have involved private industrial firms located in Lahore, Karachi, Islamabad, 
Gujranwala, Sialkot and in other cities for executing the Shaheen project.   However, 
evidence suggests that Pakistan has been facing a number difficulties in building defence 
technological capabilities in general.  Firstly, the inter-institutional linkages between 
various agencies such as public R&D laboratories, private industry and public sector 
industry in the country do not appear to be strong and also the national level co-
ordination in developing technological capabilities appears to be weak.  Secondly, 
Pakistan does not produce basic strategic raw materials such as steel alloys and it entirely 
depends on foreign imports.  Thirdly, the private industry in Pakistan appears to have 
almost no experience in manufacturing high-tech items and therefore it is unlikely to 
plays a major role in missile projects before going through a long learning curve 
(between 10 to 15 years).  And finally, there appears to be “an acute shortage of scientists 
and design engineers” due to “the poor state of technical education in the country” 
(Siddiqa-Agha, 1999, pp. 353-355).   Because of these problems, the success of 
Pakistan’s missile development projects largely depends on foreign technological 
assistance, particularly the Chinese and the North Korean assistance.  The history of 
Pakistan’s missile programme suggests that it is highly unlikely that MTCR will prevent 
either China or North Korea from assisting Pakistan.  Despite Pakistan’s repeated 
statements about developing indigenous intermediate and long-range missiles, it does not 
appear to have the capability to develop such a missile on its own at present.  It is highly 
unlikely to develop such a missile without active help from foreign countries, particularly 
either from China or North Korea.   
 
Table 6 compares the capabilities of India and Pakistan in different areas of missile 
technology (airframe, propulsion, guidance, control and navigation, and weapons 
integration) and in different types of missile systems (theatre ballistic missiles-less than 
3500 km range, ICBMs, and cruise missiles).   In the area of short range ballistic missiles 
both countries have demonstrated significant overall capabilities, that is, they have 
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reached production stage (at least in batches).  With Chinese assistance Pakistan has built 
a facility in Fatehgarh (Fatehgunj), 40 km west of Islamabad, to produce M-11s (FAS 
Website).  Using this facility, it is quite likely that Pakistan will be able to produce short 
and medium range versions of Shaheen in batches.  It could modify and improve M-11’s 
hardware and solid propellant motors, and employ its guidance, control, and navigation 
system to produce these Shaheen missiles.  However, it will not be able to produce 
medium or intermediate range missiles without considerable foreign assistance in the area 
of missile guidance, propellants, and composite materials.  Particularly, Pakistan is likely 
to face significant constraints with the intermediate range version of Shaheen and all 
Ghauri versions.   
 
Table 6:  Comparison of Technological Capabilities between India and Pakistan in 
Different Missile Systems/Technologies 
 
Technology/Weapon System India Pakistan 
1. Whole Weapon Systems:   
Theatre Ballistic Missiles (TBMs) xxxx xxx 
ICBMs xxx xx 
Cruise Missiles xxx xx 
2. Theatre Ballistic Missiles Sub-systems   
Airframe:   
Airframe Extension to Liquid Fuelled Missiles  xxxx xxx 
Post-Boost Vehicles xxx xx 
Propulsion:   
High-Energy Solid Fuel Motors xxxx xxx 
Storable Liquid Propellant Engines xxx xxx 
Strap-on-Boosters xxxx xxx 
Guidance and Control:   
Floated Inertial Measurement Units xxx x 
Digital Navigation and Control xxx xx 
Post-Boost Position Realignment and Spin xxx x 
Weapons Integration:   
Bomblets or Submunitions xxx xx 
Transporter/Erector launchers (TELs) Manufacturing xxx xx 
Separating Warheads xxxx xx 
3.ICBM Sub-systems   
Airframe:   
Serial Staging xxx xx 
Parallel Staging xxx xx 
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Strap-on Boosters xxx xx 
Propulsion:   
High Energy Solid Propellants xxxx x 
Large-Scale Cast Solid Grains xxx xx 
Large Turbo-pumps for Liquid Engines xxx xx 
Guidance and Control:   
GPS for Post-Boost Vehicles (PBV) xxx xx 
Small Guidance Computers to fit on PBV xxx xx 
Terminally Guided Re-entry Vehicles xx xx 
Weapons Integration:   
Re-entry Thermal Protection Materials xxx xx 
Post-Boost Vehicles xxx xx 
Bobmlets xx xx 
3. Cruise Missile Sub-systems   
Airframe:   
Control Surface Actuators xxx xx 
High Wing Loading Aerodynamic Designs xxx xx 
Propulsion:   
High Thrust-to-Weight Jet Engines xx xx 
Small Turbine Engines xxx xx 
Advanced High-Energy Fuels xx xx 
Guidance and Control:   
Radar Maps to Support Terrcom x x 
Digital Topographical Maps to Support GPS xxxx xxx 
Dynamic Test Equipment xxx xx 
Weapons Integration:   
Sprayers Adapted to Airstream xxx xxx 
Small Nuclear Weapons xxx xx 
4. Information Systems    
Information Communications xxx x 
Information Exchange xx x 
Information Processing xxx xx 
Information Security xxx xx 
Information Systems Management and Control xxx xx 
Information Systems Facilities xxx xx 
   
 
Source: The table was prepared by the author using ‘Nuclear weapons foreign technology assessment 
summary’ in US Department of Defense, Militarily Critical Technologies List – Part II: Weapons of Mass 
Destruction Technologies, 1996. But the author updated this summary taking into account various 
developments since 1996. 
 
Notes: 
x – Limited Capability; xx – Some Capability; xxx – Sufficient Level of Capability; xxxx – Exceeding 
Sufficient Level of Capability 
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The Ghauri versions are based on North Korean No-dong liquid propulsion system – 
TM27I (20% Gasoline/petrol + 80% Kerosene) with Oxidiser AK-27I (27% N2O4  73% 
HNO3 + Iodium Inhibitor).   This not a very efficient fuel system, although it is relatively 
less complex to handle.  Furthermore, generally liquid systems involve complex liquid 
engines and it is difficult to handle any type of liquid fuel system.  If Pakistan aims to 
produce Ghauri versions in numbers, it needs to master liquid propulsion technology, that 
is, liquid engine, liquid propellants, and associated chemicals and materials.  Also, it has 
to develop the manufacturing capability of its industry. Considering India’s experience in 
absorbing the Viking liquid engine technology from France, one can safely assume that 
Pakistan will face serious difficulties with mastering liquid propulsion technology.  It 
may take (10 to 15) years to develop indigenous capability to build liquid engines, as they 
require large number of precision components. Also, they require complex test facilities.  
Otherwise, it has to depend on importing entire liquid engines or at least all critical 
components needed to build these engines and the liquid propellants from North Korea.    
 
It is doubtful whether Pakistan has the necessary industrial capability to develop an 
efficient substitute for this North Korean liquid fuel system(s).  Also, Pakistan appears to 
have very limited indigenous capabilities in the areas of guidance, control, navigation and 
weapons integration.  Imported components and subsystems such as gyroscopes, 
accelerometers and on-board computers, mainly from China, have sustained its missile 
programme.  However, it is quite possible for Pakistan to acquire more sophisticated 
components from Western sources to modify and improve the guidance systems acquired 
from China and North Korea.  Outside the ballistic missile programme, Pakistan also has 
acquired cruise missiles -- HY-1, HY-2, FL-1, and FL-2, mainly from China (CNS 
Website).  These are relatively old conventional weapon systems and it is questionable 
whether Pakistan has the capability to modify them to deliver nuclear warheads. 
 
 
 
 
 23
5. Some Conclusions: 
 
It is clear that while India has developed an extensive nuclear infrastructure, Pakistan has 
developed a highly-weapon oriented, a narrowly focused and limited nuclear 
infrastructure.  However, this does not mean India has established an overall superiority 
over Pakistan in nuclear technology.  The experience of countries such as the US, Russia 
and the UK suggests that in the long-run the superiority of nuclear weapons technology 
of a country is likely to diminish, as nuclear technology has already matured.  Therefore, 
a less developed rival is likely to catch up and match the capability of the stronger rival.  
This trend is becoming increasingly clear in the case of India and Pakistan.  
 
Moreover, India is unlikely to produce more than a certain number of weapons, which it 
requires to maintain the ‘minimum nuclear-deterrent posture’. For example, India is 
expected to maintain a force of 150 nuclear warheads by 2010 (RAND, 2001). That 
means we are not going to witness a kind of cold-war nuclear race between the US and 
the Soviet Union in the South Asia.  Furthermore, while India is likely to direct its 
nuclear weapons against both Pakistan and China, Pakistan only needs to match India’s 
capability.  That means a determined and foreign-assisted Pakistan will sooner or later be 
able to match India’s capability in those areas where it is behind India at present.  
Various developments in the 1980s and 1990s suggest that it is quite likely that Pakistan 
could accumulate fissile material and nuclear weapon production capabilities to achieve 
some kind of parity with India in the long term.   It appears that India may continue to 
enjoy some advantages in certain areas such as thermonuclear boosting and 
thermonuclear second stage technologies.  This is because of certain advantages 
associated with plutonium based weapon designs and India’s relative superiority in 
building compact and efficient fission primary and its capability to produce materials 
such as tritium in significant quantity. As plutonium-based warheads are smaller, lighter, 
and provide higher yield than those based on uranium, Indian weapons are qualitatively 
superior to those of Pakistan.  However, this advantage may be lost in the long-term as 
Pakistan is making effort to produce plutonium and also it is likely to improve the 
sophistication of its uranium-based weapons.  Furthermore, evidence suggests that 
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Pakistan has been trying to establish significant indigenous capability in tritium 
purification. However, one area where Pakistan is likely to experience considerable 
problem, at least in the short and medium term, is developing compact nuclear warheads 
for different missile systems.  
 
However, given the close geographic proximity between India and Pakistan, coupled with 
a high population density in both countries, unlike the case of Soviet Union and the US, a 
number of cold-war nuclear warfare strategies could become irrelevant or redundant in 
the context of South Asia.   This included superiority in numbers, multiple warheads, 
high yield and high accuracy weapons for different scenarios of warfare, and so on.  This 
does not mean that both countries will not make effort to develop more sophisticated 
weapons in future.  However, such weapons are likely to provide increasingly 
‘diminished returns’ and may not alter the nuclear balance between the two countries 
significantly in the long run.   
 
Unlike the case of nuclear weapons, in the area of missile technology the gap between 
India and Pakistan appears to be more clear and significant.  Over the years, India has 
created a wider and deeper technology base in all areas of missile technology, partly 
through its civil space programme.  Particularly, India has established strong indigenous 
capabilities by the late 1990s in many critical areas such solid and liquid propellant 
systems, guidance, control and navigation systems, advanced materials, space electronics, 
and hardware fabrication.  While it is quite likely that Pakistan will be able to 
demonstrate launching of test flights of next generation Ghauri and Shaheen missiles with 
foreign assistance, it is unlikely that it will be able to produce and deploy them in 
numbers in the short-term.  Unless it is able to procure most of the critical subsystems 
from China and North Korea, Pakistan will not be able to test launch Ghauri III and 
Shaheen II (IRBMs).   This is particularly the case with Ghauri III, as it is a two-stage 
liquid system that would require a number of new subsystems and components or 
improved/modified subsystems and components employed by Ghauri I and II.  It is quite 
unlikely that Pakistan has acquired the capability to develop a new liquid engine or 
modified/improved engine of Ghauri I in a short period (since it tested the single liquid 
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stage Ghauri II in 1999).  Again, Pakistan does not appear to have the capability to 
develop an ICBM, despite its public announcements.  Even if it does have such 
capability, it may not devote its resources on developing ICBMs, because it will be 
politically and strategically unjustifiable.  On the other hand, India has capabilities to 
develop an ICBM within a short period.  It has world-class capabilities in solid 
propulsion systems and a high level of capability in liquid systems.  It has established a 
strong industrial capacity to implement its missile programme, without seriously 
depending on foreign imports.   In short, India currently enjoys superiority in a number of 
areas of missile technology over Pakistan and it is likely to continue for quite some time 
because of the rate of technological change taking place in this area.  This enables India 
to maintain a degree of superiority over Pakistan at least in the short and medium terms.  
Whether Pakistan will be able to close this gap in the near future will largely depend on 
the degree of foreign assistance it can manage to receive particularly from China and 
North Korea.   
 
If Pakistan decides to compete with India by developing capabilities to produce long and 
intermediate range ballistic missiles indigenously, it will not be able to succeed without 
committing huge resources  (both financial and human resources) over a long period 
(between 15-20 years) and without strong foreign assistance.  Also, its industry will not 
be in a position to develop and produce these missile systems in numbers, before it has 
gone through a long learning curve (at least 10 to 15 years).   Then, there is the question 
of keeping up with technological change in missile technology.  It is unlikely that 
Pakistan will be able to keep pace with the rate of technological change in missile 
technology without strong foreign assistance.   On the other hand, it quite likely that 
Pakistan may ignore ‘catching up’ with the technological change.  Instead, it may decide 
first to acquire missile systems and technologies (whether at the frontier level or old 
generation) in different range categories and then standardise and optimise them through 
incremental improvements and modifications.  In other words, it is quite likely that 
Pakistan may decide to create and maintain a missile force in all range categories (except 
ICBM) without giving much importance to their technological sophistication.   
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To recapitulate, although a number of nuclear and missile developments suggest that 
India and Pakistan are pursuing a strategic arms race, it is unlikely to be intensified to a 
higher degree in the medium and long-term when they would increasingly become 
mature. While it is increasingly clear that the nuclear build-up between India and 
Pakistan cannot be stopped or eliminated, it can be contained and managed to a less 
dangerous level.   
 
Despite nuclear weapons deployment, recent arms deals suggest that the importance of 
conventional weapons and forces are not going to be reduced in both India and Pakistan.  
This means both countries would have to maintain sophisticated conventional forces 
along with nuclear weapons deployment. This entails finding extra resources for nuclear 
weapons rather than diverting resources from convention forces by reducing their level.  
This demand for further resources is likely to be major constraint on nuclear and missile 
race in the medium and long-term.  
 
The impact of nuclear and missile developments in South Asia on regional and global 
security can be very significant.  Already India’s nuclear doctrine has raised concerns in 
China and India’s announcement about testing Agni III that will have the capability to 
strike deep into China is likely to have significant impact on Chinese strategic policies in 
the medium and long-term.  The developments in South Asia also have implications for 
the non-proliferation regimes in general.  The non-involvement of Pakistan and India in 
the existing non-proliferation regimes, particularly the NPT and MTCR, makes them 
significantly less effective. First, it is clear that Pakistan’s nuclear and missile 
programmes are linked to and supported by China and North Korea and the latter in 
particular is linked to similar programmes in other countries such as Iran.  This clearly 
shows how non-proliferation regimes could be circumvented through horizontal linkages 
between second-tier technology suppliers / recipients.  Secondly, it is likely that countries 
such as North Korea and Iran are encouraged to pursue their nuclear and missile 
programmes more vigorously, after seeing the developments in South Asia.  Therefore, it 
is important to develop new non-proliferation mechanisms to bring on-board both India 
and Pakistan.  Finally, the nuclear and missile developments in South Asia makes it 
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increasingly clear that the permanent five nuclear powers must take initiatives to achieve 
total nuclear disarmament at least within a distant timeframe, if they are very serious 
about non-proliferation and global security.  
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